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Abstract
The trope solution to the problem of mental causation combines a trope monism, i.e.  that 
properties are tropes and all tropes are physical, with a type dualism, i.e. that although all tropes 
are of a physical type, there are subsets of tropes that are also of a mental type. It does so in order 
to reconcile three individually plausible yet seemingly incompatible principles that together 
would ensure the efficacy of mental properties in a physicalist framework:  (i)  That mental 
properties are at least sometimes relevant to physical events [relevance]; (ii) that every physical 
event has in its causal history only physical events and properties [closure]; and (iii) that mental 
properties are not physical properties [distinctness].  Two major objections to the trope solution 
are addressed: the first claims that the trope solution merely replaces one problem at the level of 
events with another at the level of tropes and types;  the second claims that trope monism is 
incompatible with type dualism. The first objection is shown to be based on a flawed conception 
of the trope solution,  but it nevertheless forces a concession that opens up for the second 
objection. In defense of the trope solution it is argued that what the second objection claims to be 
a denial of the multiple realizability argument –  which is what leads to the incompatibility – 
might actually be a valid response to it.
Keywords: mental causation, properties, trope monism, multiple realizability.
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Introduction
In the borderlands between metaphysics and philosophy of mind abides the problem of mental 
causation. Metaphysicians want to know the nature of causation and what the roles of events and 
properties are. Philosophers of mind want to know the nature of the mental and how it relates to 
our physical bodies.  Since the mid-20th century these two lines of inquiry have begun to 
intertwine and it is in this area of research that the debate discussed in this essay takes place.
How is it after all that a feeling of pain – an intense, subjective and qualitative property of our 
experience – can cause a conscious intention to alleviate it and a subsequent physical action like 
rubbing the affected area or, better yet, reaching for the aspirin? Your feelings and intentions 
appear nothing like your  muscles  and their  movement.  So how does the mind and the body 
interact? In this essay, I will investigate a contemporary approach to making sense of mental 
causation. There are of course myriads of philosophical problems surrounding this issue, but my 
interest lies in a relatively narrow field of investigation.
Perhaps the most recent approach to the problem of mental causation is to move the focus from 
mental and physical events to what the nature of their properties are. I will investigate whether 
conceiving of properties as particulars rather than universals can serve to make progress towards 
a solution to the problem of mental causation.  The model I examine is David Robb’s trope 
monism. It purports to deliver what has been dubbed the trope solution.
The main question that I will attempt to answer in this essay is: do the objections raised against 
the trope solution succeed in refuting it?  My answer will be no.  My objective,  then,  is not to 
prove the trope solution right, but to show that it has stood up to serious scrutiny.
In the first section (I) of this essay I provide a background to the issue at hand; introduce identity 
theory and monism; and show why until recently that approach has been seen largely as a failure. 
In light of this, three principles are introduced that establish the requirements of a working model 
of the properties of mental causation. In the second section (II) I investigate two accounts of 
properties – universals and tropes – and go on to analyze a model based on the latter, namely 
Robb’s trope monism. In the third section (III) I turn to the objections to trope monism and the  
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trope solution and suggest some flaws and misunderstandings  in  the critique.  Finally,  in the 
fourth section (IV), I present my defense of the trope solution where I attempt to expose a flaw in 
the most important objection that, when corrected, might end up supporting rather than refuting 
it.  Let's  now  first  turn  to  a  short  history  of  the  mental  causation  debate  followed  by  an 
introduction to the contemporary debate.
I
1. Mental causation: from dualism to physicalism
The pre-philosophical,  common sense  view of  mental  causation  is  often  straightforward  yet 
deeply problematic. According to it, there is mental stuff like mind, thoughts and beliefs; and 
then there is physical stuff like the floor below, the ceiling above and your body in-between. The 
connection between the mind and the body is what makes it possible for us to interact with the  
world and yet, upon reflection, this connection is steeped in mystery. In the western tradition,  
one's mind – or “soul” – has often been said to be in some sense independent of one's body. The 
tension between independence on the one hand, and interaction on the other reveals the deeper 
problem.
In the 17th century, René Descartes advanced a kind of substance dualism, combining the claim 
that there is a real distinction to be made between mind and body –  that they are made of 
radically different substances –  with the claim that mind and body can nevertheless causally 
influence each other. Descartes suggested that this interaction occurred in the pineal gland in the 
human brain (needless to say,  modern neuroscience has put this idea to rest).1 Today,  several 
centuries later, a plausible theory of how Descartes’ mental causation would work has yet to be 
formulated and substance dualism has indeed fallen out of favor in the philosophy of mind.
There are still proponents of substance dualism to be sure – and arguments for and against it  
abound – but in this essay I will treat that debate only to put it on the shelf. The theories and  
arguments discussed herein all rest on the assumption of physicalism, which means that there is 
1 Lokhorst (2011)
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only one substance – the physical. Whatever the mental is according to this view, it is part of the 
physical world. My decision to stay within the confines of physicalism is not an arbitrary one.  
The ideas and arguments that sparked my interest in the subject all come from philosophers who 
strive to work the mental into a modern, physicalist framework and the contemporary mental 
causation debate is almost exclusively played out within it, so it is natural to stay within that 
same framework.
In the quest for a model of mental causation, physicalism is a huge leap forward compared to 
traditional  dualism  since  without  the  great  substance  divide,  the  need  for  an  elaborate 
metaphysical  bridge  is  diminished.  But  physicalism  has  problems  of  its  own.  Although 
interaction within one substance is obviously less problematic than interaction between radically 
different ones, we must be careful not to deprive the mental of its efficacy.  On physicalism, 
mental events are in some sense realized by physical events – and it all happens within a closed, 
physical system – but this doesn’t seem to leave mental events with any causal work to do. At 
the same time, we must also be careful not to build redundancy into the model by granting both 
mental  and physical  events causal  sufficiency in every case of mental  causation,  on pain of 
overdetermination.
There have been several suggestions as to what the role of mental events is, but I will focus on 
one kind of suggestion that has kept many metaphysicians and philosophers of mind busy since 
the mid-20th century,  namely that mental events are in fact identical to physical events. It is 
often  referred  to  as  identity  theory.  I  will  outline  an  early  version  of  it,  called  anomalous 
monism, which was advanced by Donald Davidson in the 1970’s. Problems in the metaphysics of 
Davidson’s monism are addressed as an introduction into a more recent debate surrounding the 
updated monism suggested by David Robb wherein the focus shifts from mental events to the 
properties of mental causation.
2. Monisms
In the article that is central to this essay, David Robb examines the role that mental properties 
play in mental causation.2 The question is what, in general, makes them causally relevant and 
2 Robb (1997)
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how non-physical (e.g. mental) properties can make a difference in a physical world. The origins 
of this mental causation debate can be traced back to an influential paper by Donald Davidson 3 
wherein he argued for anomalous monism, according to which all mental events are physical 
events. 
On anomalous monism, a mental event  c would in fact be a physical event with both physical 
and mental properties.4 I will outline Davidson’s argument below, but first I wish to define a 
couple of terms. I will borrow Davidson’s definition of ‘event’5, which fits well into the context 
of this essay. I use this definition not only for the purpose of presenting Davidson’s argument,  
but for the further discussions to follow as well.
Davidson defines events as “unrepeatable, dated individuals” and gives some examples: “...such 
as the particular eruption of a volcano, the (first) birth or death of a person [...] the playing of the 
1968  World Series”.  The difference between mental and physical events is summed up by 
Davidson: “an event is physical if it is describable in a purely physical vocabulary,  mental if 
describable in mental terms.”6 Davidson gives a number of examples of mental events: 
perceivings, rememberings, judgements, decisions, intentional actions and the changing of belief.
In a causal relation,  an event,  such as a singer reaching a certain note which causes a glass to 
shatter, has a property that is causally relevant. In the case of the singer, it is the pitch of the note 
that is the relevant property of causation.  I will go into greater detail about properties in my 
comparison of universals and tropes, but for now a standard, general understanding of ‘property’ 
will suffice. Let’s now turn to Davidson’s argument for anomalous monism:
(i) “at least some mental events interact causally with physical events.” 
(ii) “where there is causality,  there must be a law:  events related as cause and effect fall 
under strict deterministic laws.” 
3 Davidson (2001) [orig. 1970]
4 Robb (1997), 180
5 Davidson (2001), 210-11
6 Quotes from Davidson (2001), 210-11
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(iii) “there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be 
predicted and explained.”7
(iv) For mental events to be causally related to physical events,  they would have to be 
subsumed by strict deterministic laws.
(v) Events subsumed by physical laws (and thus a physical description) must be physical.8
It then follows that mental events are physical events because if they weren’t, there would be no 
way for them to causally interact with the physical given (ii) and (iii). It is of course possible to 
deny (i), but, as I mentioned at the outset, denying that mental events can interact causally with 
physical events is exactly what we’re trying to avoid.  I will revisit this point in a later section 
about epiphenomenalism.
Davidson is primarily concerned with events and not properties. Although physical events can 
have mental properties on his view without violating any of the premises of the argument, as 
Robb points out a physical event with mental properties is not a mental cause unless the mental 
properties are causally relevant.9
When a mental event c has a physical effect e,  c causes e in virtue of certain properties it has. 
Robb illustrates this in the following way:
P    M
  \   /
    c → e fig. 1
7 Premises (i), (ii) and (iii) are quoted from Davidson (2001), 209
8 Premises (iv) and (v) are implicit (added for clarity).
9 Robb (1997), 179
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P and M are the physical and mental properties of c respectively, and the diagonal lines between 
these properties and c represent the relation of instantiation of those properties.10 The properties 
in virtue of which  c causes  e are its  causally relevant properties: The Sun causes the Earth to 
stay in orbit not in virtue of its color, but in virtue of its mass, which is the relevant property. 
So we have to ask: is it in virtue of its mental or its physical properties that the event is a cause? 
The answer from Davidson –  who denies the kind of psycho-physical laws required for the 
relevance of mental properties (iii) – has to be that it is in virtue of its physical properties. This 
follows from the nomological character of causality (ii)  and anomalism (iii):  The strict laws 
required for causality gives us the interaction between mental events and physical events only 
insofar as these mental events have physical properties that can fall under such laws.  But,  as 
Robb and others have pointed out, that would mean that its mental properties are causally inert 
and would therefore entail epiphenomenalism.11
3. The threat of epiphenomenalism
Perhaps the greatest threat to any model of mental causation is that of epiphenomenalism. If 
mental and physical properties are distinct, and if the world is a closed causal system of physical  
events and properties, then any  mental events and properties are rendered causally irrelevant. 
Still, we definitely do not want to deny their existence on pain of denying what Galen Strawson 
calls “the phenomenon whose existence is more certain than the existence of anything else”, 
namely conscious experience.12
And so we’re left with a model where mental events and properties silently drift alongside the 
physical without any effect on the physical world whatsoever.  My experience of writing this 
essay,  and my feeling of excruciating freedom to do otherwise would have nothing to do with 
whether or not it gets written. However, the mere fact that these mental properties and events and 
my awareness of them seem to be at least proximate causes of my writing about them casts at 
least some serious doubt on the thesis and we are in good company in wanting to avoid 
10 fig.1 and its description is borrowed from Robb (1997), 180
11 Robb (1997), 179
12 Strawson (2006), 3
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epiphenomenalism. To do this however, we must ensure the relevance of mental properties and 
this is what, according to Robb and others, Davidson has failed to do.
4. Three principles of mental causation
The principle of relevance
The problem Robb purports to solve then, is that of fitting this principle of relevance of mental 
properties into a working model of mental causation.  The principle of relevance states that 
mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical events. The model must also take 
into account that mental properties and physical properties are distinct while both doing causal 
work within a closed system. In what follows, I will describe two principles that bear this out and 
I will then present Robb’s completed model.
The principle of distinctness
The principle of distinctness states that mental properties are not physical properties (P and M 
in fig. 1).  Mental properties are nothing like mass or solidity,  and such physical properties are 
nothing like “the angst of post-industrial man under late capitalism”,  to borrow one of John 
Searle’s favorite examples of a mental property.13 This distinction not only appeals to our 
common sense, but is important because it resolves the issue of multiple realizability. A certain 
mental property can be realized by several different physical properties.  An example would be 
the mental property ‘pain’  being realized in different physical systems such as a human’s 
nervous system vs.  that of an ant,  say.  This is the multiple realizability argument,  and it casts 
doubt on any attempt to identify mental properties with physical ones.  If the mental property 
pain in the example were identical to some physical properties of the human nervous system, 
then by transitivity of identity they in turn would have to be identical to some of the ant’s 
physical properties as well as those of any other creature that was able to experience pain. I will 
return to this argument in later sections, but for now it’s sufficient to understand the implication 
that there must be some distinction between mental and physical properties.
13 Searle (2006)
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The principle of closure
The principle of closure states that  every physical event has in its causal history only physical  
events and properties.14 Using fig. 1 to understand closure it can be formulated this way: “for any 
events c and e and property P [of c], if c causes e in virtue of P, then if e, the effect, is a physical 
event, then c, the cause, and P, the causally relevant property, are also physical.”15
One reason Robb gives for accepting this principle is the simple fact that scientific theories 
which presuppose it have often turned out to be powerful in explanation and prediction.  If 
assuming closure leads to useful scientific theories,  then we have reason to believe that the 
assumption actually tracks something about the way the world is.  Robb doesn’t give any 
examples of such theories, but it seems reasonable to suppose that what he’s talking about would 
apply to classical physics.  Theories in physics are of course in the business of explaining 
physical rather than non-physical events,  but it is not equally clear that they preclude non-
physical properties.  At the least the latter is a claim that appears stronger than the former and 
thus more in need of proper qualification.
The main argument that Robb provides for closure however,  is that (i)  if the instantiation of a 
property P is causally sufficient for an event, then no other property is causally relevant; and that 
(ii)  for every physical event there is an instantiation of a physical property that is causally 
sufficient for it.  We can call these premises (i)  exclusion and (ii)  weak closure.  From these 
premises closure follows.  For exclusion to be true,  there can be no overdetermination in the 
system,  that is,  there can never be more than one sufficient cause for any effect.  This seems 
debatable however. For example, it is not clear how Robb would account for a causal chain c -> 
d -> e where c is a sufficient cause for e because it causes d, which is also a sufficient cause for 
e. In this case there are two distinct, sufficient causes for e which would falsify (i). Perhaps it’s 
more forgiving to interpret Robb as saying that what he’s denying is rather two wholly 
independent (branching rather than linked in a chain) causes c -> e <- d both being sufficient. In 
the spirit of charity, this is the interpretation I will adopt going forward. 
14 This is also endorsed by Davidson (2001), 223
15 Robb (1997), 183
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As described, the principle of closure seems to not leave any room for mental causation.  Even 
though we can sometimes seemingly trace physical effects back to mental events and properties, 
there will always be a straightforward explanation that is physical through and through. Consider 
the following two-part example:
1. You’ve been hard at work at your desk all morning. A quick glance at the clock on the wall 
makes you realize that you’re late for a meeting.  You jump out of your chair and rush out the 
door. Suddenly there’s a lot of physical activity where just seconds ago there was – let’s face it – 
little to none.  It seems clear that it is your beliefs16 about what time it is and about today’s 
schedule that cause your actions. 
2.  But we can also tell a wholly physical story about what happened: Photons bounced off the 
clock and landed on your retina, causing nerve impulses to activate certain regions of your brain, 
ultimately resulting in muscle activity and meeting-attending behavior. 
You are not,  however,  a robot or a Chalmerian zombie17 and if asked why you went to the 
meeting you would certainly give a psychological and not a physical account. Indeed, you would 
be ignorant of most of the underlying physical processes. 
Given these three principles, there seems to be no simple way of solving the problem of mental 
causation. If mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and if the world is a closed, 
physical causal system, then it is hard to see how mental properties can be causally relevant at 
all.  This  is  where  the  trope  solution  comes  in.  But  before  we  turn  to  it,  a  more  in-depth 
discussion of properties is needed. 
16 Here I’m using ‘belief’ in the pre-philosophical sense described in an earlier section.
17 See Chalmers (1996) for a detailed account of this concept.
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II
5. On Properties
So far ‘property’, as it has appeared in this essay, has been ambiguous.  There are two ways of 
conceiving of ‘property’ that are relevant to the present debate. Consider these sentences:
(i): “The color of this page is white.”
(ii): “All the pages of this essay share the same white color.“
So there is the property of the individual page (i); and there is the fact that the other pages share 
that property in some sense (ii).
The traditional  way of making sense of sentences like (i)  and (ii)  is  by invoking universals. 
Indeed, in the mental causation debate, that properties are universals appears to be an underlying 
assumption  that  is  rarely  addressed18.  On  this  view,  (i)  is  true  if  the  individual  page  is 
instantiating the universal white (whiteness) and (ii) is true if the other pages are instantiating the 
same universal as well. In both cases the property is wholly present in the individual(s) and there 
is  no logical  inconsistency in  it  being in two or more  places  at  once.  The pages are  all  are 
instantiating the same color-universal, so they are identical in color.
The other relevant way of interpreting (i) and (ii) is with particulars rather than universals. On 
this  view,  what  makes  (i)  true  is  the  individual  page  partially  consisting  of  the  abstract  
particular  white. But since we’re dealing with particulars and not a universal (whiteness), the 
pages are not identical in color. This complicates our analysis of (ii) somewhat, because we now 
have to make sense of how two entities can share the same color while not being  identical in 
color.
A property construed as an abstract particular is commonly referred to as a trope. The particular 
color of this page is a trope and it belongs to a class of similar tropes that confer colors; and a 
subset of that class of exactly similar  (again,  not identical)  tropes that  confer “white” color. 
18 Gibb (2004), 467
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Some tropists prefer concepts  or predicates  instead of classes, but I shall go along with Orilia, 
who in commenting on the present debate vouches it safe to neglect these variants.19 All of the 
works referenced in this essay also assume classes.
In this essay,  I will use the word “type”  when talking about similarity-classes of tropes –  for 
example color-type tropes. I will also use the word “type” for properties construed as universals 
in the sense that this page is of a white type.  This might appear confusing,  but there’s a 
straightforward rationale for it: a type of trope – being a similarity-class of tropes – is analogous 
to a universal.  In the special case of classes of exactly similar tropes these classes can be 
substituted for universals.  When talking about this essay’s pages being of a white type we are 
talking about either:
universals: pages that all instantiate the universal whiteness or
tropes: pages all with tropes belonging to the same similarity-class of exactly similar 
white tropes.
This makes possible a comparison that reveals a strength in the trope-account to which we will 
return in the next section.
6. The trope solution
By introducing tropes into his model of mental causation, Robb is able to construct a new kind of 
monism – namely trope monism – that purports to be compatible with the principles discussed 
above. By monism, Robb means that all tropes are physical – there is no dualism of the mental 
and the physical at the level of events or at the level of properties qua tropes.  Both the events 
involved in causation and their properties are constituted by tropes.
So,  how  does  the  trope  solution  show  that  relevance,  distinctness  and closure are  not 
inconsistent? It does so by distinguishing between properties  qua  tropes on the one hand and 
properties qua types of tropes on the other. In this essay, when talking about a trope of type T, I 
will refer to it as a T-trope. In Robb’s ontology of mental causation there are only tropes20, and 
19 Orilia (2008), 60
20 Robb (1997), 186,  is sympathetic to the sort of trope nominalism endorsed by Williams (1953)  and Campbell 
(1990).  The distinction between concrete particulars and abstract particulars (events and tropes)  on this view is 
quantitative rather than qualitative since concrete particulars are constituted by complexes of tropes (see Williams 
(1953) for the formal argument).
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tropes are physical. They are what constitute the world. In other words, the world consists of P-
tropes (physical) that belong to similarity-classes that are all subsets of the class of P-type tropes 
with  M-tropes  (mental)  being  one  such subset  (see  fig.  2 below).  So it  follows  from trope 
monism that every M-trope is also a P-trope. 
fig. 2: t1 is a P-trope; t2 is an M-trope as well as a P-trope
There are,  for example,  color-tropes,  shape-tropes and size-tropes (physical type-  or P-tropes 
from fig.1) etc. As a crude example, when a red color-trope causes you to bring your car to a halt 
(speed-trope),  that is an instance of mental causation where some of the relevant mental 
properties (i.e. mental type- or M-tropes from fig.1) of ‘you’ are your beliefs about traffic law, 
brakes and the police. These beliefs are all comprised of M-tropes.
Since M-tropes are also (a subset of)  P-tropes,  they are just as relevant to mental causation as 
any other P-tropes are.  This satisfies the relevance principle:  mental properties are relevant 
because they are tropes and all tropes are physical.  It also satisfies the principle of closure 
because tropes of a mental type are still unproblematically part of the physical chain of events. 
Then there is the principle of distinctness. As we’ve seen, the principle of distinctness states that 
mental properties are not physical properties. If we read ‘properties’ as universals, then mental 
and physical properties would be wholly distinct and we would face epiphenomenalism once 
again.  But if we read ‘properties’  as tropes and types of tropes,  the problem goes away: 
distinctness would merely mean that M-types are distinct from non-M-types.  This would not 
require any concessions in the handling of relevance, closure and exclusion. 
It would also steer clear of the problem of multiple realizability that was introduced above. As 
we saw, theories that identify mental properties with physical properties have the problem of 
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different  physical  systems  sometimes  realizing  the  same mental  property.  Different  physical 
systems don’t usually share the same physical properties however, which they would have to do 
if they realized the same mental property, because of the transitivity of identity. But whereas the 
multiple realizability problem is devastating to an identity theory which posits that properties are 
universals, it is not as effective against trope monism. This is because the identity between the 
mental property and the physical property holds only at the level of tropes (they are the same 
trope).  The differences in the physical  systems that realize the same mental  property can be 
accounted for by the fact that the tropes belong to different physical similarity classes – they are 
of different types.
Having distinguished between property qua trope and property qua type,  Robb restates the 
principles in light of the trope solution:21
Relevance: mental tropes are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical events.
Distinctness: mental types are not physical types
Closure: every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical 
tropes. 
The principle of exclusion that supports closure also gets a trope reading:  if trope T’s being 
instantiated is causally sufficient for an event, then no trope distinct from T is causally relevant 
to that event. 
So, we’ve seen that the trope solution is compatible with the three principles, but it remains to be 
seen whether it really holds up to scrutiny. In the next section we turn to the two main objections 
to  the  trope  solution.  The  first  states  that  it  doesn’t  fare  any better  than  Davidson’s  model 
because it only serves to push the problem from one level of analysis to another. The second 
objection builds upon the first,  and maintains that the trope solution is fundamentally flawed 
unless it is modified in a specific way. Taken together, the objections appear to refute Robb’s 
model since the necessary modification fails to avoid the first objection.
21 Robb (1997), 188
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III
7. Noordhof’s objection: the qua-question revived
In a reply to David Robb22,  Paul Noordhof compares Robb’s solution to that of Davidson.  He 
observes that the main difference between their respective approaches lies in the consideration – 
or lack thereof –  of properties.  As Robb pointed out,  the crucial flaw in Davidson’s model is 
revealed when one asks the question is it in virtue of its mental or its physical properties that an 
event is a cause?. I will refer to this type of question as qua-questions.  As we saw in the 
preamble to my analysis of Robb’s model,  Davidson’s argument leads him to deny mental 
properties their causal relevance.
Does Robb’s trope monism provide the tools needed to succeed where Davidson’s monism 
failed? Noordhof’s claim is that it does not, because according to him the trope solution cannot 
evade the qua-question, appropriately conceived:
Q: Is it in virtue of a trope’s being a mental trope that mental tropes cause things?.  Noordhof 
purports to show that Robb fails to break any new ground, and that he merely moves the problem 
from the level of events and properties to the level of tropes and types. If there are both physical 
and mental types of tropes, and these types are in some way relevant to causation, then we can 
ask in virtue of which type the trope is a cause. This forces the trope theorist to exclude one of 
the types from causal relevance by choosing the other. Since this is a variant of the original qua-
question, the trope solution – as it is interpreted by Noordhof – is in violation of what he calls 
the bulge in the carpet constraint:
“No candidate solution to a philosophical problem should raise another problem which appears 
just as intractable and which requires the resolution of an issue similar to that which made the 
original problem so intractable.”23
This  constraint  seems  commonsensical  –  philosophy  is  after  all  in  the  business  of  solving 
problems rather than replacing them with new ones. However, philosophy is also in the business 
22 Noordhof (1998)
23 Noordhof (1998), 223
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of finding the most fruitful approaches to problems. It could after all be the case that a new 
problem raised in lieu of an old one has a better chance of being solved. Noordhof claims that we 
should avoid raising another problem that “appears just as intractable”, but appearance can be 
deceiving. Insofar as the bulge in the carpet constraint takes into account this subtlety, I shall 
accept it, and in a reply to Noordhof, Robb agrees with it too.24 So we must ask: does it apply in 
this case, and if so, what is the new “bulge”?
First,  let us examine the question (Q)  more closely to see if it rests on interpretations of Robb 
that are fair and correct. Q states that “mental tropes cause things” and, upon inspection, we’re 
given no reason in his article to doubt that what Noordhof assumes is that the mental tropes in 
question are the causal relata.  In fact,  he states explicitly that “tropes are causes”.25 If this is 
what Robb says, then there might indeed be a new bulge. This is because whereas the cause in 
Davidson’s case was the event, in Robb’s case it would be the trope and in both cases we can ask 
if it is in virtue of its mental properties/type that it is a cause. The fact that all tropes are physical 
wouldn’t help Robb because if a mental trope is a cause in virtue of being a physical type (to not 
violate closure) then its mental properties would have to be causally inert, just like in Davidson’s 
account and trope monism too would lead to epiphenomenalism.
But Noordhof seems to be missing something about the trope model. One of its strengths is that 
it is three-tiered as opposed to Davidson’s model which is two-tiered. By ‘tiers’ I mean levels of 
similar entities in different models of causation.  A tier has no ontological significance but is 
merely my construct for comparing different models.  In Davidson’s case,  there are these two 
tiers:
D1. the concrete particular (the event) that is the cause and
D2. its causally relevant properties.
This forces Davidson to read properties in the same (the only)  way in relevance,  closure and 
distinctness which leaves the three principles inconsistent – which was Robb’s indictment in the 
first place. In Robb’s model however, there are three tiers:
24 Robb (2001), 91
25 Noordhof (1998), 222
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R1. the concrete particular (the event) that is the cause26,
R2. its tropes (properties as particulars) and
R3. the tropes’ types (properties as similarity-classes of particulars (tropes)).
As described earlier, on trope monism property is to be read as ‘trope’ in relevance and closure 
but as ‘type’ in distinctness. Noordhof seems to get this wrong. As I’ve shown, he assumes that 
the tropes – and not concrete particulars – are the causal relata,  i.e.  that they do the work that 
events do in Davidson’s model. But this fails to take into consideration Robb’s first tier (R1) and 
actually misses one of the main points of the trope solution.  It is R1,  and not R2,  that 
corresponds to D1.  And it is R3  that corresponds to D2,  since –  as we saw in the section on 
properties – types can be seen as both similarity classes of tropes and as universals. R2, then, is a 
tier of what Robb calls “intermediate entities”27 and there is no corresponding tier in Davidson’s 
model.
Thinking in tiers makes it easier to grasp the nuances of Robb’s model since it is not as clearly 
stated in his article. Robb seems to realize this need for clarification only a few years later in a 
reply to Noordhof where he ends up confirming my, rather than Noordhof’s, interpretation.28
With this clarification in mind, we can turn back to Noordhof’s question and see if it applies to 
the trope solution, properly understood. Since we established that it’s the concrete particular that 
is the causal relata,  we must now restate Noordhof’s question and not ask in virtue of what a 
mental trope is a cause, but rather in virtue of what the mental trope is causally relevant: Q’: Is it 
in virtue of being mental or in virtue of being physical that the trope is causally relevant to the 
effect?.29 What makes the original question posed to Davidson so devastating is that it is asked 
about events that have both physical and mental properties and Davidson’s monism cannot 
account for the relevance of the mental properties.
In the case of tropes, however, the question seems to lose its force. The trope is the property and 
it is one and the same while being of two types: It is a member of both the similarity-class of 
26 A concrete particular, as opposed to an abstract particular (or trope), is an object or event (etc.) that has properties. 
In the case of universals,  a concrete particular instantiates universals (this is what I take to be the most plausible 
reading of Davidson’s view).
27 Robb (1997), 187
28 Robb (2001), 91
29 I’ve borrowed this formulation of the question from Maurin (forthcoming), 1
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physical tropes and the subset of mental tropes, but it is not in virtue of its type that it is causally 
relevant – it is in virtue of being the causally relevant trope, full stop.
Perhaps there is another level of analysis to which Noordhof’s question is pertaining – perhaps 
tropes have aspects.  This would raise a new version of Q’,  namely Q’’:  Is it in virtue of its 
mental aspect that a mental property (a mental trope) is causally relevant?.  We might wonder 
what a “mental aspect”  is supposed to be.  In Robb’s reply he takes this to mean secondary 
properties,  that is,  properties of properties,  which my understanding of Noordhof’s objection 
leads me to think is fair. He then provides an analogy to show why trope monism does not need 
aspects: “[A] ball’s shape is not roundness in virtue of this or that property it [the shape] has, it 
is just roundness full stop.”.30 The property roundness is a particular property (its shape-trope) 
which belongs to a similarity-class of round shape-tropes and it is in virtue of this shape-trope 
that it has the shape it has and not in virtue of any secondary properties (aspects) belonging to the 
shape-trope. Robb simply denies that tropes have aspects according to his model, so Noordhof’s 
objection fails since none of the supposed “new bulges”  can be found (by means of Q,  Q’ or 
Q’’). At least on its own it fails, but we now move on to an objection that takes into account the 
concessions made by Robb in his exchange with Noordhof and attempts to deliver a refutation of 
the whole trope approach.
Before getting into the next objection it is helpful to recap some of what we have now learned 
about trope monism. It is a monism only at the level of events and tropes because they are all of 
the same type (physical).  There is however a kind of dualism lurking at the level of types 
(between P-tropes and M-tropes), in fact it is this type-dualism, as I have called it, that resolves 
the apparent inconsistency of the three principles relevance,  closure and distinctness. The fact 
that all M-tropes are also P-tropes (see fig.2) is what keeps the dualism barred from the causally 
relevant tiers of events (R1)  and tropes (R2).  Furthermore,  we learned that tropes do not have 
causally relevant aspects but are themselves the causally relevant properties. With this improved 
understanding of trope monism we may now turn to Gibb’s objection. 
30 Robb (2001), 93
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8. Gibb’s objection: monism, dualism and aspects
S. C. Gibb suggests another problem with the trope solution.31 She argues that it is not possible to 
combine a trope monism with a type dualism, because trope monism entails type monism. When 
the trope solution avoids violating the principle of distinctness – that mental properties are not 
physical properties – it does so by appealing to a dualism of types (M-tropes and P-tropes).  If 
this turns out not to be possible,  then Robb’s model is indeed in trouble.  To see how Gibb 
reaches her conclusion, let’s first get reacquainted with the argument from multiple realizability 
(MRA).
A mental property,  like ‘pain’  (M in fig.3),  can be realized by multiple,  different physical 
systems with different physical properties: ‘pain’ in humans (P1 in fig.3) vs. ‘pain’ in ants (P2 in 
fig.3)  to use a familiar example.  The lines between M and P1 and P2 respectively in fig.3  
represent the realization of a mental property by physical properties.
fig.3
If monism is true,  and mental properties are identical to physical ones,  then by transitivity of 
identity, the different physical properties that realize ‘pain’ must also be identical. Furthermore, 
this must apply to all mental properties and across all physical systems the physical properties of 
which realize them. The sheer implausibility of this state of affairs should lead us to reject the 
identity between mental and physical properties.
If M, P1 and P2 are properties qua universals, then the problem is obvious: M = P1, and M = P2 
entails that  P1 = P2. But whether you choose the color or the shape of the figures in  fig.3 to 
31 Gibb (2004)
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represent the physical  property that realizes the mental  one,  it  is apparent that  P1 ≠ P2 and 
therefore, given MRA, that mental universals cannot be identical to physical universals.
On trope monism however, the problem is not as apparent. If M = P1 and M = P2 then what this 
means is merely that P1 is a physical pain-trope (of a mental type) and that the same goes for P2. 
The fact that P1 ≠  P2 is a trivial matter since tropes are particulars and only identical to 
themselves. P1 ≠ P2 is true by definition.
Where trope monism runs into trouble is when it comes to accounting for how it could make 
sense to talk about ‘pain’  being the same thing in both cases at all.  At the level of particulars 
(tropes)  we’re given no reason to think that what it’s like to be in ‘pain’  for one person has 
anything at all to do with what it’s like for another person or other animal. This, incidentally, is 
not an issue for a universalist model,  since my pain and your pain would be the same kind of 
thing because they are instantiations of the same universal mental property.  And so we need a 
relation between the tropes P1 and P2 such that this becomes possible for trope monism too. 
Similarity is just such a relation. If P1 and P2 belong to a similarity-class of mental tropes, then 
of course my pain is similar to yours.  In my discussion of properties I described the analogy 
between universals on the one hand and types of tropes on the other. In the above case we see 
how types can give trope monism the benefits of unity that is built into universalist models, 
without the hassle of identity.
But this is an unsatisfactory solution, says Gibb, and this is where her main argument for trope 
monism entailing type monism gets its foothold. For trope monism to reap the benefits of unity 
that  universalist  models  enjoy,  the  relation  between  tropes  such  as  P1 and  P2 needs  to  be 
stronger than mere similarity, according to Gibb. It needs to be that of exact similarity. To deny 
this would be to deny MRA.32 That is, since only classes of exactly similar tropes are analogous 
to universals, for Robb to appeal to  inexact  resemblance (of the mental tropes) in MRA-cases 
would not be a valid response to MRA. I will return to this point in a later section and attempt to 
reveal a flaw in Gibb’s reasoning. Now, trope monism does allow for the possibility of exact 
similarity between tropes. Again, the pages of this essay all have color-tropes that are exactly 
similar. The problem however, is that if it’s right as Gibb says that exact similarity is needed in 
32 Gibb (2004), 471
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response  to  MRA, then  trope  monism fails  just  like  any other  theory  that  identifies  mental 
properties with physical properties.
To see this, let M in fig.3 be the class of exactly similar, mental, pain tropes to which the mental 
tropes M1 (which is identical to P1) and M2 (which is identical to P2) belong. Since all tropes 
are physical, P1 and P2 also belong to some similarity class(es) of physical tropes. Since P1 is 
identical to M1, and M1 is exactly similar to M2 (both belonging to M), by transitivity of (exact) 
similarity,  P1 must also be exactly similar to P2 –  they must both belong to the same class of 
exactly similar, physical pain tropes – call this class P. From this it follows that M = P because 
since all tropes in M are exactly similar, they must also belong to the same similarity-classes, and 
the same is true of all tropes in P. So both P and M must consist of all,  and only those, tropes 
that belong to both classes.  What this shows is that trope monism is incompatible with type 
dualism. So, if Gibb’s argument is sound, trope monism does fall prey to MRA because it cannot 
achieve distinctness by appealing to type dualism. Thus, if Gibb is right, the trope solution fails.
Gibb goes on to suggest that there is one – and only one – way for Robb to avoid this fate. He 
could allow for tropes to have aspects. We can see this by importing aspects into the case above: 
If M1/P1 has aspects X1 and Y1,  and M2/P2 has aspects X2 and Y2,  and aspects X1 and X2 
(let’s call it the pain’s mental aspects)  exactly resemble each other while Y1 and Y2 (the 
physical aspects) do not, then distinctness could again be achieved, only at the level of aspects 
rather than at the level of types.
But in his defense against Noordhof’s critique, and in compliance with the bulge in the carpet  
constraint, Robb himself has already closed that door. Gibb too believes that allowing aspects is 
not  the  way  forward,  not  only  because  it  re-invites  the  qua-question  as  demonstrated  by 
Noordhof, but also because it’s ontologically dubious. But it is only if Robb allows aspects that 
the trope solution can escape Gibb’s refutation, so given the two objections represented above, 
Robb ends up in philosophical checkmate.
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IV
9. In defense of the trope solution
First let us delineate Gibb’s argument:33
(i) In terms of universals, MRA concerns a single mental universal being realizable by 
different physical universals.
(ii) Only classes of exactly similar tropes can be substituted for universals.
(iii) In terms of tropes then, given (i) and (ii), MRA concerns members of a class 
of exactly similar tropes of a mental type being realizable by physical tropes that do 
not  themselves exactly resemble one another.
(iv) But given (iii) the trope solution cannot succeed because of the transitivity of exact 
resemblance – if the tropes in question belong to a class of exactly similar mental 
tropes, then they must also belong to the same class of exactly similar physical tropes 
and these classes would be identical.
(v) To claim instead that classes of inexactly similar mental tropes can take the place of 
the tropes in (iii) is to deny MRA34. This follows from (i), (ii) and (iii).
(C) From (iv) and (v): The trope solution fails.
According to the first (i) claim, if properties are universals, and mental properties are identical to 
physical  properties,  then  the  physical  properties  of  all  systems  that  realize  the  same mental 
universal must be identical. This is of course deeply problematic for any universalist identity 
33 Henceforth I will assume  – as both Robb and Gibb does – that tropes do not have aspects. As such, trope monism 
is at least potentially vulnerable to Gibb’s argument and to the multiple realizability argument (MRA) as we saw in  
the previous section. For a thorough description of MRA, see page 18 of this essay.
34 This point will be elaborated in a discussion to follow.
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theory and since it’s grounded in a cornerstone of logic, namely the transitivity of identity, its 
force is undeniable.
The second claim, (ii),  is about something that has been addressed earlier in this essay –  that 
types of tropes are analogous to universals,  but only when they are classes of exactly similar 
tropes.  The corollary of this is what’s important to Gibb’s argument,  namely that it is not 
possible to substitute inexact resemblance classes for universals. To see that this is true – which I 
agree that it is – imagine the color-universal sky blue. For the sake of argument we’ll postulate 
that this is one very specific color (property) – the one which you can hopefully see if you look 
out your window. The equivalent to this universal in trope terms is the class of color tropes that 
are all exactly similar in that they are all sky-blue-tropes. Now let’s modify our class of tropes to 
also include turquoise tropes. Turquoise is very similar to sky blue, but it isn’t exactly similar. In 
universalist terms these turquoise tropes cannot, as it were, be included in the sky blue universal 
– turquoise must be conceived of as a universal of its own. However close the inexact similarity 
of tropes in a class,  any difference between them will break the analogy with universals since 
they can then only be accounted for in terms of different universals.
The third (iii)  and the fifth (v)  claim bears this out:  Trope monism must approach MRA as an 
argument against identifying mental types and physical types where these types are construed as 
classes of exactly similar tropes, on pain of denying MRA. As we saw in (iv), this renders trope 
monism just as vulnerable to MRA as a universalist identity theory because transitivity works the 
same way for exact resemblance as it does for identity.
But what exactly does Gibb mean by denying MRA? And why would it be a problem if the trope 
solution denies MRA as it is stated in (iii)? It seems to me that Gibb gives insufficient reason for 
us to accept that this is a problem for trope monism.35 The only reason she gives is that sets of 
inexactly  resembling  tropes  are  to  be  substituted  within  a  theory  of  universals  for  different  
universals, which we saw in the sky blue / turquoise example above, and that this somehow 
makes it ill-fitting for MRA. This, however, presupposes the specific reading of MRA in (iii), 
35 See Gibb (2004), 471, 475, for her mentions of this issue.
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and I will now attempt to show that the tropist is in fact not required to yield to that version of  
the argument. 
To see this, first we must understand the ontological significance of MRA. Traditionally it’s been 
leveled against identity theories where properties have been assumed to be universals. ‘Pain’ is 
the staple example of a mental universal, and it’s one that I myself have used in this essay. For a 
universalist identity theory, the fact that different creatures can be in pain qua the same mental 
universal is a problem because their respective physical properties that realize pain are not 
identical,  whereas their mental ‘pain’  property is,  and this violates transitivity of identity.  But 
let’s say that we try to resolve this by postulating slightly different ‘pains’  so that the mental 
property ‘human pain’  is not identical to,  say,  ‘dolphin pain’.  Perhaps the slight difference 
between these mental ‘pain’ properties could account for the slight difference in neurology (the 
relevant physical properties). This, however, is not a move that the universalist is free to make 
because just like in the sky blue /  turquoise example,  any slight difference between two 
properties renders these properties as different universals and that would deny MRA. But while 
this move is not open to the universalist, I believe that it is open to the tropist. On trope monism, 
‘human pain’ and ‘dolphin pain’ are both tropes that belong to the same class of (very) similar 
mental tropes.  So the tropist can say that tropes from different (i.e.  not identical)  classes of 
similar physical tropes can realize tropes that belong to the same similarity class of mental 
tropes. This would then pass the test of MRA.
Is this denying MRA as claimed in (v)? What I take to be the denial of MRA that Gibb warns us 
of in the case of inexact similarity is that if we don’t talk about either one and the same universal, 
or whatever the equivalent of it would be within another theory (see (ii) above for example), then 
we cannot account for the fact that we’re talking about the same thing when we’re talking about 
for example ‘human pain’ and ‘dolphin pain’. While this is trivially true in the sense that we’re 
not talking about the same qua identical thing,  it is not clear that very close similarity is not a 
good enough substitute for identity in MRA when we have tropes in the picture. I would argue 
that it is at least as intuitive to speak of pain in terms of close similarity as it is to speak of it in 
terms of identity – and trope monism gives us the freedom to do so. 
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Compare this to a trope account of nuances of red color. Scarlet and crimson are very similar, but 
not exactly so. Both nuances belong to a class of inexact resemblance that we call ‘red’. There is 
no doubt that when you see a scarlet color, and I see a crimson color, we can both say that we’re 
talking about red, rather than blue, colors. Let’s now apply MRA to this state of affairs. Red, as 
described above, is multiply realizable. A scarlet dress and a crimson rose both realize tropes in 
the same class of red tropes.  The physical properties that realize this red type are not exactly 
similar however (scarlet tropes and crimson tropes). So even though the scarlet trope is identical 
to a trope in the class of red tropes (they are the same trope), and the crimson trope is identical to 
a trope in that same class (they are the same trope),  there is no transitivity of exact similarity, 
because the class of red tropes is a class of inexactly similar tropes.  We can both nevertheless 
still say that the dress and the rose are red. While this is perhaps not a perfect analogy to a human 
and a dolphin both being in pain despite not having exactly similar physical properties that 
realize the pain, it should serve to make my point.36
Even the universalist could drop the identity requirement (one universal) and instead talk about 
slightly different pains (different universals),  but that would be problematic for another reason 
since,  in the limit,  there would be different mental ‘pain’  universals for every single physical 
system that can realize pain. In other words, it would actually lead to a trope-like account (add 
classes of similar universals and you have the complete conversion).
Employing tropes and similarity-classes in response to MRA is not denying the argument if 
‘denying’  means avoiding or sweeping it under the rug.  On the contrary,  proponents of trope 
monism are free to accept MRA and even to accept that it is as devastating to trope monism as to 
any other identity theory if types are read as exact similarity classes.  Appealing to inexact 
similarity is not a denial of the argument,  it is a lesson learned from acknowledging it.  And I 
believe that it is a valid response to it – perhaps the only one.
So, whereas it makes sense to use the traditional MRA as stated in (i) against universalist identity 
theories, we have not been given reason enough to accept that trope monism must go the same 
way. If the significance of MRA is to show that a theory must be able to account for the fact that 
36 Robb (2012) argues along the same lines in his recent reply to this kind of objection.
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different physical properties can realize the same mental property – an intuition that I share – 
then we should take into account the different tools with which different theories can do this. As 
I’ve tried to show, trope monism is uniquely qualified to do so by utilizing inexact similarity 
classes of mental and physical tropes. If we allow for inexact similarity in MRA – as I’ve argued 
that we can and should – then we have no reason to accept that trope monism denies MRA, nor 
do have any reason to accept that trope monism succumbs to MRA or that trope monism is 
incompatible with type dualism. 
In sum, Gibb fails to argue for the truth of her conclusion that the trope solution fails.
10. Conclusion
David Robb’s trope solution to the problem of mental causation purports to reconcile three 
individually plausible but seemingly incompatible principles of mental causation:  That mental 
properties are at least sometimes relevant to physical events [relevance];  that every physical 
event has in its causal history only physical events and properties [closure];  and that mental 
properties are not physical properties [distinctness]. 
The solution is to combine a trope monism with a type dualism. By reading mental properties as 
tropes (which are fundamentally physical),  relevance and closure can be achieved while 
distinctness is ensured by reading properties as types of tropes, e.g. in response to the multiple 
realizability argument. 
In this essay, two objections to the trope solution were addressed. The first attempts to show that 
trope monism fails to make any progress over other identity theories and that it instead replaces 
one problem with another, similar problem. It turns out that this objection fails against the trope 
solution properly understood. One concession made by Robb in responding to the first objection 
– that tropes do not have aspects – opens up for a second objection: If tropes do not have aspects, 
then trope monism is incompatible with type dualism and the trope solution fails. 
The main thrust of this second objection is that the trope solution must either deny or concede 
the multiple realizability argument. I attempted to show that the ‘denial’ option is in fact not a 
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denial, but rather a valid response to the multiple realizability argument properly conceived. I 
have not shown, nor have I attempted to show, that the trope solution succeeds on all counts in 
solving the problem of mental causation. I have however tried to demonstrate that the objections 
addressed herein fall short of refuting it.37
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